Igor Korolev (korolev) wrote,
Igor Korolev

Ошибка Саакашвили

Об издании Moscow Defence Brief я узнал недавно, после его скандальной о том, что половина потерянных Россией в Грузии военных самолетов была сбита российскими же войсками. Таким образом, видно, что этому изданию можно доверять.
Я заглянул в его архив - что они писали год назад о российско-грузинской войне. Обнаружил очень интересную статью главреда Михаила Барабанова, где четко изложена суть конфликта.

Во-первых, верно отмечено, что "Революция роз" - это никакая не демократическая, а националистическая революция.

The August War in Georgia began with the fateful decision of President Mikhail Saakashvili to launch a campaign against South Ossetia on August 7. This step could be seen as an impulsive and sudden decision of a Caucasus leader. However, the attack on Tskhinvali was in fact the logical outcome of the policies of the leader of “Free Georgia.”

The Georgian “Rose Revolution” of late 2003 was neither democratic in form nor motivated by democratic ideals. The driving force of this mass movement against the then President Eduard Shevardnadze was radical Georgian nationalism, and the main accusation leveled against Shevardnadze was the fact that he did not use force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia when those regions declared their independence in the early 1990s. Having seized power in Tbilisi in late 2003, Saakashvili distinguished himself from the other oppositional leaders by his especially radical rhetoric, not shying away from racist attacks against the Abkhazians and Ossetians and openly calling for violence against the former autonomous regions. It was this, not democratic slogans, that made Saakashvili attractive to the crowds in Tbilisi; it was precisely his promise to “solve” the Abkhazian and South Ossetian “issues” that brought Saakashvili to power.

Далее рассказывается о длившейся все время правления Саакашвили подготовке к вйоне.

The development of the Georgian army was the main task, accompanied by world-record-breaking increases of the defense budget, which grew from 2003 to 2008 in dollar terms by 33 times. In 2007, Georgia spent 8 percent of its GDP on defense, and would have spent 10 percent in 2008 even without the August War, surpassing the defense spending levels of the Stalinist North Korean regime. It is clear that Georgia, with its fragile economy and huge balance-of-payments deficit, could not sustain this level of defense spending for very long. Saakashvili gambled everything on the wager that a victory over the “separatists” would recoup all losses.

О роли Запада, готового связаться с любым, кто пойдет против России:

Saakashvili was able to find support in the West, first of all from the United States, which has always based its policy in the post-Soviet space on the primitive principle that “whatever is bad for Russia is good for us.” That said, the Americans at first followed a contradictory policy. On the one hand, they wanted stability in Georgia and the Caucasus as a whole, to serve among other things as an energy transit corridor from the Caspian that bypassed Russian territory. On the other hand, the United States also wanted to use Georgia to inflict the maximum possible harm on Russia and to undermine Russian political influence in the region. The second aim inevitably led to American support for all anti-Russian rhetoric and action, including openly destabilizing steps, like the unfreezing by Saakashvili of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, it is not surprising that the United States sent Saakashvili confused and self-contradictory signals, ones that he could interpret according to his whim. In practice, American policy veered toward automatic support of Saakashvili against Russia on every issue, without serious analysis of his actions in the broader context of American interests. The logic of “he may be a bastard, but he's our bastard” began to take hold, allowing Saakashvili to manipulate Western support for his own interests. The tail wags the dog.

О стратегической ошибки Саакашвили - пытаться одновременно захватить Абхазию и Южную Осетию и войти в НАТО, на что Россия, естественно, не могла согласиться:

Saakashvili's drive to NATO membership would prove to have even more catastrophic consequences for Georgia's foreign policy. Assuming that NATO membership would secure the West’s close involvement in Georgia's problems, Saakashvili lost not only the chance to take back the territories, but also any chance of joining NATO. The policy was unrealistic from the start. Even if Russia could be persuaded to hand over Abkhazia and South Ossetia to a friendly Georgia, it could never transfer these territories to NATO. In effect, Saakashvili pushed Russia toward the use of these territories to block Georgia's pro-Western drive.

О том, что Россия по-началу помагала Саакашвили - и к власти придти, и Аджарию ему сдала (что было, кстати, стратегической ошибкой, так как теперь там загарают НАТО'вцы):

On the whole, Saakashvili's Russian policy presents as an exceptional example of self-destructive action. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were for a long time at the distant periphery of Russia's interests, and its policy was to preserve the status quo of stability, and to urge the two regions that had declared their independence toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Georgia. Since the end of the 1990s, Russia had supported the regime of economic sanctions against Abkhazia, and in general severely limited its relations with both republics. At the end of 2003, Russia even welcomed the arrival of Saakashvili to replace the weak and ineffective regime of Shevardnadze. Moreover, Moscow initially gave serious support to Saakashvili, de facto securing his reestablishment of control over Adjaria, in spite of the pro-Russian orientation of the local leader Aslan Abashidze. Russia agreed to withdraw its military bases from Georgia. If Saakashvili had followed a more sensible and flexible policy, he stood a good chance to secure Russian support with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well. All that was required of Saakashvili was to respect Russia's obvious interests in those regions and its desire to avoid violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the waves of which could penetrate into the Russian territories of the North Caucasus.

Наконец, напоминается, что первую попытку взять Цхинвали Саакашвили осуществил еще в августе 2004 года, а взятие Аджарии представил как победу над Россией:

Instead, Saakashvili launched an aggressive anti-Russian policy in the hope that this would secure US support and ultimately force Russia to withdraw from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Simultaneously, Saakashvili initiated the “unfreezing” of the conflicts in both zones, organizing the first military campaign in South Ossetia in 2004, which very quickly fell apart. Blaming Moscow for the failure, and at the same time declaring the return of Adjaria as a “victory over Moscow,” Saakashvili unleashed an hysterical anti-Russian campaign, declaring Russia to be the chief enemy of Georgia. At that point, Georgia-Russian relations came to the brink. Russia's reaction was at first purely reactive, but as Georgia continued to sow tensions, Moscow's position hardened. When it became clear in 2006 that Saakashvili's main goal was preparation for military action to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that Georgia was becoming a militaristic state, the inevitability of military intervention to protect the two autonomous regions became clear to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the thickheaded Georgian leader, with unbelievable negligence, ignored Moscow's clear signals that it would intervene.

Ну и печальный - не для него ,к сожалению, - а для Южной Осетии и всей Грузии результат:

Saakashvili's policy toward Russia was based on the completely mistaken assumption that he could simply ignore Russia and its interests and exclude Russia from the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He was convinced of this in spite of Georgia's significant economic dependence on Russia and in spite of the fact that only Russia held the key to resolving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian issues. Saakashvili seemed to entertain the fantasy that Russia was somehow located on another planet; he acted in complete denial of the obvious realities of Georgia's history and geography. But only a few hours after he had launched his war in South Ossetia, the tanks of Russia's 58th Army quickly showed the Georgian President where things actually stood. Saakashvili wanted a war, and that is what he got.

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